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ABSTRACT 
 
Conditional Tests of Corporate Governance Theories. (May 2005) 
Jianxin Chi, B.E., Qingdao University; 
M.B.A., Idaho State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. D. Scott Lee 
 
Agency theories suggest that governance matters more when agency conflicts are 
potentially more severe.  However, empirical studies often do not control for the 
potential severity of agency conflicts.  I show that the marginal benefit of governance 
varies with the free cash flow level, a proxy for the potential severity of agency conflicts.  
As the free cash flow level increases, higher governance quality becomes incrementally 
more value-enhancing, and lower governance quality becomes incrementally more 
value-destroying.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that better governance helps 
resolve the agency conflicts in investment decisions when a firm has more free cash 
flows (Jensen, 1986).  This study highlights the importance of controlling for the 
potential severity of agency conflicts in governance studies and provides an improved 
method to estimate the marginal benefit of a governance mechanism. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The value of corporate governance lies in its ability to constrain agency conflicts.  
Theories suggest that the potential severity of agency conflicts varies across both time 
and firms.  For example, Jensen (1986) asserts that the potential agency costs increase 
when the free cash flow level increases:   
Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies are 
especially severe when the organization generates substantial free cash flow.  
The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than 
investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organization 
inefficiencies. (p.323, emphasis added.) 
 
Johnson et al. (2000) develop a model predicting that the potential agency costs increase 
when investment opportunities decrease:  
… in countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic prospects 
result in more expropriation by managers ... (p.141, emphasis added.) 
 
If the potential severity of agency conflicts varies, the importance of governance quality 
should also vary; that is, good governance is more beneficial when the agency conflicts 
are potentially more severe. 
However, empirical studies often overlook this conditional relationship between 
governance quality and firm value.  This oversight leads to low-power tests and has the 
potential to produce evidence that is inconsistent with theoretical predictions.  On the 
one hand, theories clearly predict that better governance mechanisms can help resolve 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Financial Economics. 
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agency conflicts and increase firm value,1 as is supported by numerous event studies.  
For example, we see that outsider-dominated boards make different decisions than 
insider-dominated boards, and the market usually favors the decisions made by outsider-
dominated boards (e.g., Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Borokovich, 
Parrino, and Trapani (1996), and Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001)).  On the other hand, 
large-sample empirical studies often do not detect a direct relationship between firm 
value and various governance mechanisms, such as board structure (Bhagat and Black, 
2002), managerial ownership (Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999), managerial 
compensation (Palia, 2001), and an assortment of governance variables (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996).  A common explanation to this non-correlation between firm value and 
governance quality is not that governance does not matter, but that firms choose their 
governance mechanisms optimally.  As such, empirical studies should not observe any 
value effect of a specific governance mechanism (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  
However, this argument cannot explain why event studies often do detect a governance 
effect.   
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) attribute the conflicting evidence between event 
studies and large sample studies to noisy proxies and the endogeneity between firm 
value and the governance mechanisms.  I offer another explanation: theories suggest that 
the relationship between governance quality and firm value depends on the potential 
severity of agency conflicts, but large-sample studies that do not control for the 
conditional aspect of these theories are by construction low-power tests of the theories.  
                                                 
1 Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrate how agency conflicts directly lower firm value, and how 
governance mechanisms can reduce agency costs and increase firm value. 
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Ideally, a good governance mechanism should engage when the potential agency 
conflicts become severe.  Event studies generally focus on times when the potential 
agency conflicts are severe and the marginal benefit of good governance is pronounced.  
For example, we know that managers tend to overinvest, and one way this tendency 
manifests itself is through acquisitions.  An effective board of directors should alleviate 
overinvestment, which is what Byrd and Hickman (1992) find: tender offer decisions 
made by outsider-dominated boards are valued more favorably by the market.  However, 
the large-sample study by Bhagat and Black (2002) does not find that board structure 
affects firm value or performance. 
In this study, I examine the marginal benefit of governance quality on firm value 
(Tobin’s Q) while controlling for the potential severity of agency conflicts.  I measure 
governance quality by the Governance Index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  
The level of this index equals the number of governance provisions a firm has.  More 
provisions indicate more restricted shareholder rights and therefore lower governance 
quality.  Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) construct the Entrenchment Index with six 
governance provisions that most effectively entrench incumbent managers.  I use the 
Entrenchment Index as an alternative measure of governance quality and obtain 
consistent results.  Motivated by Jensen (1986) and Johnson et al. (2000), I use a firm’s 
free cash flow level as the proxy for the potential severity of agency conflicts.  I allow 
the effect of governance on firm value to be conditional on (i.e. vary with) the free cash 
flow level by creating an interaction term between the free cash flow level and the 
Governance Index.   
  
 4
I show that the effect of governance quality on firm value varies with the free 
cash flow level.  The part of this governance effect that does not vary with the free cash 
flow level is close to zero.  As the free cash flow level increases, higher governance 
quality becomes incrementally more value-enhancing, and lower governance quality 
becomes incrementally more value-destroying.  This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that better governance helps resolve the agency conflicts in investment decisions when 
the free cash flow level is high (Jensen, 1986).  It is also consistent with previous 
findings in the literature that firms with lower governance quality tend to have higher 
capital spending and make more acquisitions.  This result is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that low cash flow levels or poor investment opportunities exacerbate the 
agency problem of managerial expropriation (Johnson et al., 2000).  One explanation is 
that my sample only includes U.S. firms.  The U.S. has one of the strongest investor 
protection systems in the world, which makes expropriation a costly behavior for 
managers.2 
The results of this study show that to correctly estimate the marginal benefit of a 
governance mechanism, one must control for the potential severity of agency conflicts.  
Recent corporate scandals have brought about new efforts to improve the quality of 
corporate governance.  It is important for all stakeholders to understand that since the 
potential severity of agency conflicts differs across firms, the marginal benefit of any 
governance mechanism also differs across firms.  Any one-size-fits-all approach to 
                                                 
2 The recent study by Durnev and Kim (2004) further confirms the strong investor protection environment 
in the U.S.  Examples of other cross-country studies of investor protection include La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998, and 2000). 
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strengthen corporate governance is unlikely to be efficient or even effective.  A firm 
should adopt a governance mechanism only when the marginal benefit outweighs the 
marginal cost.  The empirical models in this study provide an improved method to 
estimate the marginal benefit of governance.  Future studies can use these models to 
evaluate the marginal benefit of other governance mechanisms, such as board structure, 
managerial ownership, and compensation.   
Governance studies have largely focused on the two-dimensioned relationship 
between governance quality and firm value.  However, this two-dimensioned description 
is incomplete.  The complete description requires a third dimension, namely the potential 
severity of agency conflicts, which affects the relationship between governance quality 
and firm value.  Controlling for the potential severity of agency conflicts is different 
from controlling for the interaction between different governance mechanisms.  For 
example, Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) document that firms with entrenching 
ownership structures benefit more from the monitoring function of debt.  They still only 
ask what governance mechanism matters, not when it matters.  A firm with entrenching 
ownership structure will benefit even more from the monitoring function of debt when 
the potential agency conflicts are more severe, such as when the firm generates 
substantial free cash flows.   
This study indicates that at least for the U.S. firms covered by the sample, the 
agency conflicts associated with investment decisions are more detrimental to firm value 
than managerial expropriation.  This is not surprising once we recall that financial 
theories always agree that firm value is ultimately created by investing in positive NPV 
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projects.  Big firms have failed amid recent corporate scandals, and the media have often 
dramatized how greedy CEOs steal from innocent investors.  However, the amount 
stolen by CEOs is often miniscule compared to the value destroyed by poor investments.  
A CEO can certify his annual reports and not steal a penny yet destroy billions of dollars 
by poor investments.  The results of this study suggest that it may be more fruitful for 
the government and the investment society to direct their governance reform efforts to 
first resolve the agency conflicts in investment decisions.   
Two limitations of this study warrant some discussion.  First, endogeneity is 
always a challenge for governance research.  I use panel data fixed effects to mitigate the 
endogeneity caused by unobservable firm characteristics that may simultaneously affect 
both the Governance Index and firm Tobin’s Q.  However, this remedy is not perfect 
since the unobservable firm characteristics may be time-varying while a fixed effects 
model assumes the unobservable firm characteristics are time-invariant.  The other 
source of endogeneity is reverse causality, namely firm Tobin’s Q may actually affect 
the Governance Index, rather than the other way around.  Chi (2004) and Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) explore this possibility and conclude that this reverse causality is 
unlikely.  The fact that the Governance Index is predetermined with respect to firm 
Tobin’s Q also reduces the possibility of reverse causality.3  Another way to solve the 
endogeneity problem is to use instrumental variables for the Governance Index.  
                                                 
3 See the discussion in Greene (2000, p. 657). 
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However, I have not been able to identify truly exogenous and strong instruments for the 
Governance Index (also see the remark by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003, p.131).4   
The second limitation is that although the free cash flow level has strong 
theoretical foundation to be the conditioning variable, there may be other conditioning 
variables that work as well or even better.  This may be an interest for future research.  
Because the true free cash flow level is unobservable, I use two proxies to measure the 
free cash flow level: 1) operating income minus taxes, interests, and dividends, and then 
scaled by book assets (Lehn and Poulsen,1989), and 2) EBITDA (earnings before 
interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) scaled by book value of assets.  
Although these two are popular measures of free cash flow, they are nevertheless noisy 
proxies for the potential severity of agency conflicts. 
I describe the data in Chapter II.  I describe the empirical tests and the results in 
Chapter III, discuss the results in Chapter IV, and conclude in Chapter V. 
                                                 
4 See Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2003) for a recent discussion on the endogeneity between 
governance quality and firm value.  Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) explore the determinants of 
governance mechanisms and alternative ways of creating governance indecies. 
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CHAPTER II 
DATA AND A DISCUSSION ON PANEL DATA FIXED EFFECTS 
2.1    Data  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to test whether the marginal benefit of 
governance quality on firm value varies with the potential severity of agency conflicts.  
Thus, the key variables are the proxies for firm value, governance quality, and the 
potential severity of agency conflicts.5 
I use a measure of Tobin’s Q as the proxy for firm value.6  Firm Q’s are 
calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book 
value of equity and deferred taxes and then divided by the book value of assets.  Each 
firm’s Q is adjusted by its industry median, where the 48 industry classification follows 
Fama and French (1997).   
To measure governance quality, I use the Governance Index “G” constructed by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).7  The level of a firm’s G equals the number of 
corporate-governance provisions the firm has and ranges from 2 to 19 for the sample 
                                                 
5 I only study the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.  I do not study the agency conflicts 
between debt holders and shareholders. 
6 Q has been widely used as a measure of firm valuation or management performance.  A few examples of 
these studies include Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Lang, Stulz, 
and Walkling (1989), and Lang and Stulz (1994).  Some other studies have used Q or some close 
variations of it as a measure of growth opportunities, such as Smith and Watts (1992), Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1991), and Opler and Titman (1993).  These two different uses of Q are not very difficult to 
reconcile if we believe that firms with better growth opportunities are also valued higher.  Yet other 
studies have used Q or some close variations of it as proxies for other things, such as over or under-
investment (Lang and Litzenberger, 1989) and agency costs (Lehn, Netter, and Poulsen, 1990).  In the 
asset pricing literature, book-to-market ratio of equity (close to the inverse of Q) has been used as 
measures of risk (e.g., Fama and French, 1996) or mispricing (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1994).  It is beyond the scope of this paper to reconcile all the different uses of Q.  However, I do 
acknowledge that Q is a noisy measure of firm valuation, and we should keep this in mind when 
interpreting the results. 
7 I thank Andrew Metrick for providing the CRSP permnos associated with the sample firms. 
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firms.  More provisions (higher G) reflect more restricted shareholder rights and lower 
governance quality.  The governance provision data are from the Corporate Takeover 
Defenses published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC, 1990, 1993, 
1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002).  For a year when IRRC has no publication, I use the G 
from the immediately preceding publication.  For example, for 1991 and 1992, I use the 
G of 1990.  This procedure is commonly followed by other studies that use the G Index.  
The firms covered by IRRC represent over 90% of the market value on NYSE, AMEX, 
and Nasdaq.  Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick acknowledge that “while this simple index 
does not accurately reflect the relative impacts of different provisions, it has the 
advantage of being transparent and easily reproducible (p.114).”  It is important to 
notice that those governance provisions are intended not only for takeover defenses.  
Some provisions such as classified board and supermajority voting can be used on other 
occasions to help the management stay in power.  Therefore the level of the G Index 
indicates how restricted shareholder rights are. 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) identify six of the IRRC provisions that have 
the most impact on firm value and stockholder returns.  Four of the six severely limit 
shareholder voting rights (classified boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, 
supermajority requirement for mergers, and supermajority requirement for charter 
amendments).  The other two insulate the incumbent management from the discipline of 
hostile takeovers (poison pills and golden parachutes).  With these six provisions, 
Bebchuk et al. construct an Entrenchment Index “E”, ranging from zero to six. Higher 
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index value reflects greater managerial entrenchment.  I use this Entrenchment Index as 
an alternative measure of governance quality. 
To find a proxy for the potential severity of agency conflicts, I search the theories 
for predictions as to when agency conflicts are expected to be more severe.  Jensen 
(1986) asserts that managers have the tendency to overinvest.8  When a firm has more 
free cash flows, more discretionary resources are susceptible to managerial 
misappropriation, agency conflicts are potentially more severe, and hence governance is 
more important to firm value. 
Therefore, I use the free cash flow level as the proxy for the potential severity of 
the agency conflicts associated with investment decisions.9  Jensen defines free cash 
flow as the “cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive 
net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital (p.323).”  The true free 
cash flow level is not directly observable.  We observe a firm’s gross level of cash flow 
from operations and the firm’s capital expenditure, but a firm’s true free cash flow level 
is not the difference of the two.  By definition, a firm suffering higher agency costs will 
have higher capital expenditure and a lower cash flow level after capital expenditure.  In 
this situation, a lower cash flow level after capital expenditure signals higher, rather than 
lower, agency conflicts.  Therefore, the observed cash flow level after capital 
expenditure is not a valid proxy for the true free cash flow level. 
                                                 
8 Stein (2003) surveys the agency costs related to investment decisions.  There are numerous studies on 
managerial empire building.  Besides Jensen (1986), examples include Baumol (1959), Marris (1964), 
Williamson (1964), Donaldson (1984), and Jensen (1993).  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also extensively 
discussed this topic in their survey. 
9 Dow, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2003) use an aggregate free cash flow measure as a state variable 
while studying how imperfect corporate control affects equilibrium asset prices. 
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Jensen’s free cash flow theory says that when managers have more cash to spend, 
there is a greater chance that they will spend the cash unwisely.  Therefore, all we need 
is a measure of how many resources are at the managers’ disposal, and Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) develop a measure that is arguably a good proxy for that.  They use 
operating income minus taxes, interest payments on debt, and dividend payments on 
equity.  I scale this free cash flow measure by the firm’s book value of assets and refer to 
it hereafter as the free cash flow level (FCF).  FCF measures how much cash is left for 
the managers to spend after paying taxes and financial obligations.  It is important to 
emphasize that higher FCF reflects the potential severity of managerial overinvestment.  
Not all firms overinvest when FCF is high, but those with poor governance quality do.  
Therefore the marginal benefit of governance quality is more pronounced as FCF 
increases. 
As FCF decreases, the potential severity of overinvestment decreases, but the 
potential severity of managerial expropriation may increase.  One reason for this to 
happen is that if managers extract extra rents through either overinvestment or 
expropriation, lower FCF makes overinvesting more difficult and therefore may induce a 
greater propensity to expropriate other shareholders.10  Another reason is given by 
Johnson et al. (2000), who develop a model predicting that holding managerial 
ownership constant, poor investment opportunities exacerbate managerial expropriation.  
This follows if we assume that a manager can increase his wealth through only two ways: 
                                                 
10 Agency conflicts of equity manifest themselves mainly through investment decisions and managerial 
expropriation.  Another manifestation is shirking, which can be reasonably treated as being subsumed by 
the agency conflicts associated with investment decisions. 
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receive returns from his ownership in the firm by investing in positive NPV projects, or 
expropriate other shareholders.  When investment opportunities are poor, the manager 
cannot increase his wealth through investing and therefore is more likely to expropriate.  
However, when investment opportunities abound, the manager is less likely to 
expropriate because he stands to gain more by investing all available resources in value-
enhancing projects, which increase the value of his ownership in the firm.  This model 
does not consider the agency conflicts associated with investment decisions. 
Johnson et al. (2000), Mitton (2002), and Lemmon and Lins (2003) study the 
1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis and show that countries and firms of lower 
governance quality lost more value during the crisis.  They interpret the evidence as 
consistent with lower governance quality allows more managerial expropriation in bad 
times.  FCF is a defensible proxy for investment opportunities because lower FCF gives 
the manager fewer resources to invest and often indicates that the expected return on 
marginal investment is low. 11  Therefore, I use lower FCF as a proxy for higher potential 
severity of managerial expropriation. 
I use EBITDA (earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
scaled by book value of assets) as the alternative proxy for the free cash flow level.  
Examples of studies that have used EBITDA as a free cash flow measure or as a 
robustness check include Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), Fenn and Liang (2001), and 
Palia (2001). 
                                                 
11 On average it is reasonable to expect that higher cash flows from operations reflect higher return on 
marginal investment.  However, this is not always true.  For example, the oil industry in the late 1970’s 
and early 1980’s faced high average return but low marginal return on investment, as discussed in Jensen 
(1986).   
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Following Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), I include in the Q regressions the 
following controls variables: the log of assets, the log of firm age measured in months, a 
dummy variable indicating firms that are incorporated in Delaware, and a dummy 
variable indicating firms that are members of the S&P500 index.  Previous research 
shows that these variables are likely to affect firm Q.  In addition, I include a firm’s 
current and last year sales growth to control for the firm’s growth opportunity.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the regression variables.  Appendix A gives a 
detailed account on how each variable is constructed.  All accounting data are collected 
from Compustat.  I use firm-level fixed effects models to control for unobservable firm 
heterogeneity that may simultaneously affect both governance quality and firm value.  
Since a fixed effects model derives its estimation only through within-firm (i.e. time-
series) variation, I restrict the sample to firms that have experienced some change in the 
Governance Index over the sample period.  If a firm’s G Index is constant over the 
sample period, the G Index and the firm fixed effects dummy will be perfectly 
multicollinear.  That firm will not contribute to the coefficient estimation but only 
introduce noise and lower the test power.  This data restriction eliminates about 2,000 
firm years.  I apply the same restriction when using the Entrenchment Index, and it 
eliminates about 6,000 firm years.  The results without this restriction are not 
qualitatively different although the statistical significance is not as high. 
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Table 1: A Summary of the Regression Variables.  A detailed description of how to construct these variables can be found in Appendix A.  The data are from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) and Compustat.  The sample period is 1990-2002.  To be included in the firm-level fixed effects regressions, a firm needs to have had some change in G (or E) over 
the sample period.
Variables Definition N Mean Media
n 
Std 
Dev 
Min Max
Industry-
adjusted Q 
Industry-median adjusted firm Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the book value of assets plus 
the market value of equity minus the book value of equity and deferred taxes and then divided 
by the book value of assets.  The market value is calculated at the end of each year, and the 
book value is calculated at the end of the fiscal year.  48 industries are classified at the end of 
each year according to Fama and French (1997). 
11279      0.350 0.025 1.288 -3.311 29.474
G The firm-level Governance Index as in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  The level of a 
firm’s G equals the number of corporate-governance provisions the firm has.  Higher G levels 
(i.e. more provisions) reflect more restricted shareholder rights and lower governance quality.  
Firms with dual-class shares are not included in this study. 
11279      
      
      
      
      
  
       
       
9.105 9 2.772 2 19
E The firm-level Entrenchment Index as in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004).  Construction 
of the E index is limited to only six governance provisions that directly lower shareholder 
voting power and insulate managers from the discipline of hostile takeovers.  Higher E levels 
(i.e. more provisions) reflect more restricted shareholder rights and lower governance quality.  
Firms with dual-class shares are not included in this study. 
7868 2.005 2 1.289 0 6
FCF The measurement of undistributed cash flow and is calculated as operating income minus the 
sum of the following four components: a) total income taxes minus the change in deferred 
taxes from the previous year to the current year, b) gross interest expenses on debt, c) 
dividend payments on preferred stocks, and d) dividend payments on common stocks.  I scale 
this free cash flow measure by the firm’s book value of assets. 
10616 0.070 0.074 0.093 -1.609 0.541
EBITDA Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by the firm’s book 
value of assets.   
11032 0.133 0.133 0.110 -1.370 0.965
logBV The log value of a firm’s book value of assets, in US$ millions. 11279 7.256 7.110 1.614 2.086 13.908
logAge The log value of firm age measured in months since the firm’s first appearance in Compustat. 11279 5.508 5.799 0.644 2.485 6.223
Delaware 
Dummy 
A dummy variable equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware. 11279 0.530 1 0.499 0 1
S&P500 Index 
Dummy 
A dummy variable equals one if the firm is included in the S&P500 Index. 11279 0.344 0 0.475 0 1 
Sales Growth Firm annual sales growth rate. 11279 0.101 0.062 0.464 -1.000 36.191
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Table 1 shows that the adjusted firm Q is positively skewed with large extreme 
values.  My model specifications partly account for the potential non-linearity between 
Q and the G Index, and therefore should reduce the concern that outliers are driving my 
results.  Outliers should be included in the sample unless we have sufficient evidence 
that they are results of data errors.  I have no evidence that the extreme Q values are the 
results of any systematic data error.  Nevertheless, in un-tabulated tests, I winsorize the 
adjusted-Q at the top 1% and bottom 1% levels.  That is, I set all adjusted-Q’s below the 
one percentile to the one percentile value (-1.43) and all the adjusted-Q’s above the 99 
percentile to the 99 percentile value (5.59).  The regression results (not tabulated) are 
similar to the reported results.  In un-tabulated tests, I also winsorize FCF and EBITDA 
at the top and bottom 1% levels.  The results are similar to the reported results. 
2.2    A discussion on panel data fixed effects 
 
I use panel data fixed effects models in this study.12  A fixed effects model 
controls for unobservable firm heterogeneity.  The main motivation of using a fixed 
effects model is not that the unobservable firm heterogeneity is fixed (i.e. constant) over 
time, but rather that the unobservable firm heterogeneity may be correlated with the 
independent variable.  If the unobservable firm heterogeneity is correlated with the 
independent variable but is omitted from the regression, the error term, which by 
definition contains the omitted firm heterogeneity, will be correlated with the 
independent variable.  This correlation between the error term and the independent 
variable causes endogeneity and biased coefficient estimate.  A fixed effects model 
                                                 
12 See Baltagi (2002) for a detailed explanation on panel data models. 
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mitigates this endogeneity problem by creating a dummy variable for each firm.  Thus, 
by extracting the omitted firm heterogeneity from the error term, the error term is no 
longer correlated with the independent variable, and the coefficient estimate will be 
unbiased.13 
The omitted variable bias is a concern when studying the effect of governance on 
firm value because different firm characteristics may affect firms’ choices on their 
governance structure (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  Some of the firm characteristics may 
be unobservable.  For example, one firm may have an honest and ethical corporate 
culture that leads to both higher governance quality and higher firm value.14  A 
regression model not controlling for this unobservable firm characteristic will document 
a positive but spurious correlation between governance quality and firm value. 
Another unique feature of a fixed effects model is that it derives its estimation 
solely from the within-firm (time-series) variation.  Therefore, a fixed effects model 
directly examines how the change in a firm’s governance quality affects its firm value, 
and how this governance effect varies with the firm’s potential severity of agency 
conflicts.  Since the ultimate goal of all economic studies is to make some causal 
inference, and since a causal relationship is essentially a time-series one, a fixed effects 
model serves this goal well.   
However, it is conceivable that governance quality affects firm value not only in 
the time series but also in the cross-section.  A random effects model captures both the 
                                                 
13 One limitation of this remedy is that if the omitted variable is not fixed but varies over time, the firm 
dummies will not completely capture the effect of the omitted variables.   
14 Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) discuss other examples of unobservable firm characteristics 
that may affect both governance quality and firm value, including some superior monitoring technology, 
the perceived valued of firm intangible assets by the market, and different degrees of market power. 
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time-series and the cross-sectional variations, and therefore produces more efficient 
estimates than a fixed effects model does.  However, a random effects model assumes 
that the unobservable firm heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the independent variable 
and therefore may suffer the potential endogeneity caused by omitted variables.  Since I 
am concerned about the endogeneity caused by omitted variables, I use fixed effects 
models in this study.  Hausman (1978) specification tests for fixed effects or random 
effects reject the assumption of no endogeneity in my models and therefore validate the 
use of fixed effects.   
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CHAPTER III 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
I use two proxies for governance quality: the Governance Index “G” and the 
Entrenchment Index “E.”  I will first focus on the tests using the Governance Index and 
then discuss the tests using the Entrenchment Index.  Both proxies produce results 
consistent with the main hypothesis that the effect of governance quality on firm value 
varies with the potential severity of agency conflicts. 
3.1 Using the Governance Index as a proxy for governance quality 
 
Table 2 presents the results using the Governance Index as the proxy for 
governance quality and the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) FCF measure as the proxy for the 
potential severity of agency conflicts.  Column (1) in Panel A shows that the average 
marginal benefit of eliminating one corporate governance provision (i.e. lowering a 
firm’s G Index by one) is an increase in firm Q of 2.6 percentage points, significant at 
the one-percent level.   
Examining the control variables we see book size is negatively related to Q, but 
firm age is positively related to Q.  Coefficients on the Delaware incorporation dummy 
and the S&P500 dummy are not significant.  These two variables have little within-firm 
variation, and a fixed effects model is unlikely to pick up their effects.  The current year 
and the last year sales growth have significant explanatory power for Q.  This is 
expected since Q reflects the expectation for future growth, and high Q firms are 
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Results – The Governance Index “G” Interacting with Free Cash Flow (FCF).  Shown in this table are the 
panel data fixed effects (firm-level) results by regressing industry-adjusted firm Tobin’s Q on firms’ Governance Index “G”, FCF or 
dummies indicating the FCF levels, interactions between G and FCF or its dummies, and the control variables.  FCF is operating 
income after taxes, interests, and dividends, scaled by total assets.   The control variables include a dummy variable for incorporation 
in Delaware, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is included in the S&P500 index, the log of assets in the current year, the 
log of firm age in the current year measured in months, and firm current year and last year sales growth.  A detailed explanation of 
the regression variables can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A.  The data are from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) and Compustat.  The sample period is 1990-2002.  To be included in these firm-level fixed effects regressions, a firm must 
have some change in G over the sample period.  Regression coefficients are shown with White (1980) robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten-percent, five-percent, and one-percent levels. 
 
Panel A: Governance Index Interacting with Dummies Indicating FCF Levels 
 
TOP1/3 is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s FCF is among the top third of all sample firms in that year.  Similarly, BOT1/3 is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm’s FCF is among the bottom third of all sample firms in that year.  G×TOP1/3 and G×BOT1/3 are the 
interaction terms between G, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3.   
  
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are G and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
G (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.026*** 
(0.010) 
-0.017** 
(0.009) 
-0.030*** 
(0.011) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
G×TOP1/3 (β2)  -0.033*** 
(0.011) 
 -0.031*** 
(0.011) 
G×BOT1/3 (β3)   0.014 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Control Variables:     
TOP1/3  0.657*** 
(0.123) 
 
 
0.622*** 
(0.116) 
BOT1/3   -0.299*** 
(0.102) 
-0.120 
(0.089) 
LogBV -0.229*** 
(0.039) 
-0.199*** 
(0.039) 
-0.222*** 
(0.039) 
-0.198*** 
(0.039) 
LogAge 0.306*** 
(0.069) 
0.320*** 
(0.067) 
0.318*** 
(0.069) 
0.326*** 
(0.067) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  -0.022 
(0.108) 
-0.003 
(0.108) 
-0.007 
(0.108) 
0.003 
(0.108) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.054 
(0.079) 
0.044 
(0.078) 
0.059 
(0.078) 
0.047 
(0.078) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.168** 
(0.078) 
0.140** 
(0.068) 
0.157** 
(0.074) 
0.136** 
(0.066) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.083** 
(0.036) 
0.066** 
(0.032) 
0.074** 
(0.035) 
0.063** 
(0.032) 
Prob > F ( test for joint significance) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of firm years 11279 11279 11279 11279 
Prob > F (test that all firm fixed effects are 
jointly zero) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.581 0.574 0.581 
     
β1 + β2 
(Prob>F) 
 -0.050*** 
(0.000)  
-0.049*** 
(0.000) 
β1 + β3 
(Prob>F)   
-0.016 
(0.105) 
-0.015 
(0.139) 
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Table 2: Continued. 
 
Panel B: Governance Index Interacting with FCF 
  
TOP1/3 and BOT1/3 are dummies indicating a firm’s FCF level in the sample and is described in Panel A.  G×FCF is the interaction 
term between G and FCF.  G×FCF×TOP1/3 and G×FCF×BOT1/3 are the three-way interaction terms between G, FCF, TOP1/3, and 
BOT1/3.  FCF×TOP1/3 and FCF×BOT1/3 are the interaction terms between FCF, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3. 
 
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are G and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
G (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
G×FCF (β2) -0.221* 
(0.132) 
-0.154 
(0.135) 
-0.402*** 
(0.156) 
-0.194 
(0.151) 
G×FCF×TOP1/3 (β3)  -0.263** 
(0.118) 
 -0.202*** 
(0.079) 
G×FCF×BOT1/3 (β4)   0.171 
(0.197) 
-0.051 
(0.185) 
Control Variables:     
FCF 4.318*** 
(1.294) 
2.017 
(1.322) 
8.720*** 
(1.629) 
4.688*** 
(1.585) 
FCF×TOP1/3  6.174*** 
(1.240) 
 4.169*** 
(0.849) 
FCF×BOT1/3   -6.735*** 
(2.009) 
-2.672 
(1.897) 
LogBV -0.228*** 
(0.039) 
-0.166*** 
(0.037) 
-0.164*** 
(0.037) 
-0.152*** 
(0.037) 
LogAge 0.398*** 
(0.068) 
0.351*** 
(0.063) 
0.300*** 
(0.063) 
0.310*** 
(0.062) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  -0.014 
(0.119) 
0.024 
(0.117) 
0.023 
(0.116) 
0.031 
(0.116) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.138* 
(0.075) 
0.118 
(0.073) 
0.136* 
(0.073) 
0.124* 
(0.072) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.078* 
(0.044) 
0.057 
(0.037) 
0.054 
(0.035) 
0.051 
(0.035) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.048 
(0.030) 
0.031 
(0.024) 
0.023 
(0.025) 
0.024 
(0.023) 
Prob > F ( test for joint significance) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of firm years 10616 10616 10616 10616 
Prob > F (test that all firm fixed effects 
are jointly zero) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.589 0.605 0.605 0.608 
     
β2 + β3 
(Prob>F)  
-0.417*** 
(0.003)  
-0.396*** 
(0.012) 
β2 + β4 
(Prob>F)   
-0.231 
(0.152) 
-0.245 
(0.129) 
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often labeled growth firms.  Not reported here, I have also used the R&D to total assets 
ratio as a control variable.  The R&D variable is insignificant in the presence of the sales 
growth variables.  Inclusion of the R&D variable also significantly reduces the sample 
size.  Therefore I do not include R&D as a control variable in the regressions. 
The regression model of Column (1) assumes that the marginal benefit of 
improving governance quality (i.e., the −0.026 coefficient estimate) is constant for all 
firms at all time.  However, theories suggest that the marginal benefit of governance 
should vary with the potential severity of agency conflicts.  Governance is more 
beneficial when the agency conflicts are potentially more severe. 
As discussed in the previous section, theories suggest that overinvestment 
becomes potentially more severe as FCF increases, while managerial expropriation 
becomes potentially more severe as FCF decreases.  This implies a non-linear 
relationship between FCF and the potential severity of agency conflicts.  Figure 1 
provides a visual illustration of this potential non-linear relationship.  
A simple way to control for this potential non-linearity is to use dummy variables 
to partition the firm-year observations into different FCF levels.  I sort the sample firms 
annually into FCF thirds and create two dummies: TOP1/3it (BOT1/3it) is a dummy 
variable equal to one if firm i’s FCF is among the top (bottom) third of all sample firms 
in year t.  I then interact the Governance Index with these two dummies, and the results 
are in Columns (2) through (4) of Panel A in Table 2.   
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A
t
Potential 
overinvestment 
Potential managerial 
expropriation 
Total potential agency 
costs of equity 
The free cash flow level
Figure 1: An illustration of the potential non-linearity between the free cash flow level 
and the potential agency costs.  As the free cash flow level decreases, the potential 
agency costs associated with managerial expropriation increase (Johnson et al., 2000).  
As the free cash flow level increases, the potential agency costs associated with 
overinvestment increase (Jensen 1986).  The total agency costs may have a U-shaped 
curve in the free cash flow level. 
 
The results in Column (2) show that when a firm is not in the top third FCF 
group, the coefficient estimate for G is −0.017.  When a firm is in the top third FCF 
group, the coefficient estimate for G is −0.017 − 0.033 = −0.050, highly significant at the 
one-percent level, as shown in the second row from the bottom.   The difference, −0.033, 
is significant at the one-percent level, indicating that governance quality affects firm 
value more when a firm has high FCF than when it has lower FCF.  I include TOP1/3 as 
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a control variable to ensure that the interaction term G×TOP1/3 only captures the 
interaction effect, not the effect of TOP1/3.  The coefficient on the TOP1/3 dummy is 
large and significant, indicating the importance of including TOP1/3 as a control 
variable.   
Comparing Columns (1) and (2) we can see that the negative correlation between 
G and Q is more pronounced when a firm has higher FCF.  The results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that potential agency costs are higher and therefore governance is 
more important when a firm has more cash to invest. 
Column (3) shows that when a firm is not in the bottom third FCF group, the 
coefficient estimate for G is −0.030 and significant.  When a firm is in the bottom third 
FCF group, the coefficient for G is −0.030 + 0.014 = −0.016, with a p-value of 0.105, as 
shown in the bottom row. The difference of 0.014 is not significant.  The results do not 
indicate that governance quality is more important when a firm’s FCF is low, 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that potential managerial expropriation is more severe 
and governance is more important when FCF is low.   
The regression in Column (4) of Panel A includes both of the interaction terms 
between G and the FCF dummies.  When a firm is in the middle third FCF group, the 
coefficient on G is −0.018, marginally significant.  When a firm is in the top third FCF 
group, the coefficient on G is −0.018 − 0.031 = −0.049, significant at the one-percent 
level.  When a firm is in the bottom third FCF group, the coefficient on G is −0.018 + 
0.003 = −0.015, insignificant.  The economic interpretation is that when a firm’s FCF is 
among the top third of all firms, removing one governance provision that restricts 
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shareholder rights increases the firm’s Q by 4.9 percentage points.  When a firm is in the 
bottom third FCF group, changing the Governance Index has no significant impact on 
firm value. 
The results in Panel A of Table 2 give a coherent picture of how the marginal 
benefit of governance varies with the potential severity of agency conflicts.  When the 
free cash flow level is high, higher good governance quality is more beneficial, and 
lower governance quality is more harmful.   
In Panel B of Table 2, I allow the marginal benefit of the Governance Index to 
vary with FCF.  Column (1) shows that the marginal benefit of the Governance Index on 
firm value is ∂Q/∂G = −0.013 − 0.221×FCF.  The part of this marginal benefit that does 
not vary with FCF is −0.013 and insignificant.  The part that varies with FCF is 
−0.221×FCF, where −0.221 is significant at the ten-percent level.  The −0.221 
coefficient means that as the cash flow level increases, the adverse effect of higher 
Governance Index (i.e. lower governance quality) becomes incrementally greater.  This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that higher FCF increases the potential severity of 
overinvestment, but inconsistent with the hypothesis that lower FCF increases the 
potential severity of managerial expropriation.  
With a mean value of 0.070 for FCF, the marginal effect of the Governance 
Index is −0.013 − 0.221×0.070 = −0.028.  That is, removing one governance provision 
will increase a firm’s Q by 2.8 percentage points.  When FCF increases by one standard 
deviation of 0.093, the marginal effect of the Governance Index changes to −0.049.  
Now, removing one governance provision increases a firm’s Q by 4.9 percentage points.  
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The higher the free cash flow level is, the more beneficial it is to grant shareholders 
more rights.  Because the correlation coefficient between FCF and the G Index is only 
0.037,  the results are not likely to be affected by high correlation between FCF and G. 
Again, to control for the potential non-linearity between the potential severity of 
agency conflicts and the free cash flow level (Figure 1), I use dummies to partition my 
sample firms into three cash flow groups, and the results are in Columns (2) through (4) 
in Panel B of Table 2.  Column (2) shows that for the top third FCF firms, the coefficient 
for the interaction term G×FCF is −0.154 − 0.263 = −0.417, which is significant and 
different from −0.154.  The insignificant −0.154 coefficient on the interaction term is for 
firms not in the top third FCF group.  This result indicates that for a high-FCF firm, as 
the free cash flow level increases, the marginal benefit of higher governance quality 
becomes even greater. 
Column (3) in Panel B shows that for firms in the bottom third FCF group, the 
coefficient for the interaction term G×FCF is −0.402 + 0.171 = −0.231, quite large but 
insignificant nevertheless.   
The regression model in Column (4) includes both of the interaction terms 
between the G, FCF, and the FCF dummies.  When a firm is in the middle third FCF 
group, the part of the marginal effect of the G Index that varies with FCF is −0.194, 
insignificant.  When a firm is in the top third FCF group, the part of the marginal effect 
of G that varies with FCF is −0.194 −0.202 = −0.396, highly significant.  When a firm is 
in the bottom third FCF group, the part of the marginal benefit of G that varies with FCF 
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is −0.194 − 0.051 = −0.245 (p-value = 0.121).  The part of the marginal effect of the G 
Index that does not vary with FCF is close to zero (−0.004). 
The results in Panel B of Table 2 show that the marginal benefit of the 
Governance Index on firm Q varies significantly with a firm’s free cash flow level.  The 
part of this marginal benefit that does not vary with the free cash flow level is close to 
zero.  As the free cash flow level increases, higher governance quality becomes 
incrementally more value-enhancing, and lower governance quality becomes 
incrementally more value-destroying.  That is, as a firm’s cash flow level increases, 
higher Governance Index will more adversely affect its Q, and this effect is more 
pronounced for high cash flow firms.  This is consistent with higher free cash flow level 
increases the potential severity of agency conflicts.   
The regressions in Table 3 use EBITDA as the alternative proxy for the free cash 
flow level and have the same specifications as those in Table 2.  The results in Table 3 
are qualitatively close to the results in Table 2.   
3.2 Using the Entrenchment Index as a proxy for governance quality 
 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) provide theoretical argument and empirical 
evidence that not all the governance provisions are equally damaging to firm value.  
They identify six provisions that most effectively restrict shareholder rights and lower 
governance quality.  Four of the six are “constitutional” provisions that limit 
shareholders’ voting rights: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, 
supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter 
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Results – The Governance Index “G” Interacting with EBITDA. Shown in this table are the panel data fixed 
effects (firm-level) results by regressing industry-adjusted firm Tobin’s Q on firms’ Governance Index “G”, EBITDA or dummies 
indicating the EBITDA levels, interactions between G and EBITDA or its dummies, and the control variables.  EBITDA is operating 
income before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by total assets.  The control variables include a dummy variable 
for incorporation in Delaware, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is included in the S&P500 index, the log of assets in the 
current year, the log of firm age in the current year measured in months, and firm current year and last year sales growth.  A detailed 
explanation of the regression variables can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A.  The data are from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) and Compustat.  The sample period is 1990-2002.  To be included in these firm-level fixed effects 
regressions, a firm must have some change in G over the sample period.  Regression coefficients are shown with White (1980) robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten-percent, five-percent, and one-percent levels. 
 
Panel A: Governance Index Interacting with Dummies Indicating EBITDA Levels 
 
TOP1/3 is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s EBITDA is among the top third of all sample firms in that year.  Similarly, BOT1/3 is 
a dummy equal to one if the firm’s EBITDA is among the bottom third of all sample firms in that year.  G×TOP1/3 and G×BOT1/3 
are the interaction terms between G, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3.   
 
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are G and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 
G (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.035*** 
(0.010) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
G×TOP1/3 (β2) -0.051*** 
(0.012) 
 -0.047*** 
(0.011) 
G×BOT1/3 (β3)  0.027 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
Control Variables:    
TOP1/3 1.023*** 
(0.135) 
 
 
0.941*** 
(0.124) 
BOT1/3  -0.531*** 
(0.109) 
-0.243*** 
(0.089) 
LogBV -0.166*** 
(0.038) 
-0.201*** 
(0.039) 
-0.156*** 
(0.038) 
LogAge 0.279*** 
(0.066) 
0.276*** 
(0.068) 
0.263*** 
(0.066) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  0.022 
(0.106) 
0.007 
(0.108) 
0.034 
(0.106) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.026 
(0.076) 
0.058 
(0.078) 
0.031 
(0.075) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.127** 
(0.063) 
0.152** 
(0.071) 
0.120** 
(0.060) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.051* 
(0.028) 
0.073** 
(0.032) 
0.048* 
(0.027) 
Prob > F ( test for joint significance) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of firm years 11279 11279 11279 
Prob > F (test that all firm fixed effects are 
jointly zero) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.591 0.577 0.593 
    
β1 + β2 
(Prob>F) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000)  
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
β1 + β3 
(Prob>F)  
-0.008 
(0.489) 
-0.006 
(0.575) 
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Table 3: Continued.  
 
Panel B: Governance Index Interacting with EBITDA 
  
TOP1/3 and BOT1/3 are dummies indicating a firm’s EBITDA level in the sample and is described in Panel A.  G×EBITDA is the 
interaction term between G and EBITDA.  G×EBITDA×TOP1/3 and G×EBITDA×BOT1/3 are the three-way interaction terms 
between G, EBITDA, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3.  EBITDA×TOP1/3 and EBITDA×BOT1/3 are the interaction terms between EBITDA, 
TOP1/3, and BOT1/3. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are G and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
G (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
-0.000 
(0.017) 
G×EBITDA (β2) -0.134 
(0.121) 
-0.026 
(0.139) 
-0.229** 
(0.113) 
-0.106 
(0.122) 
G×EBITDA×TOP1/3 (β3)  -0.185** 
(0.074) 
 -0.128** 
(0.057) 
G×EBITDA×BOT1/3 (β4)   0.175 
(0.129) 
0.008 
(0.112) 
Control Variables:     
EBITDA 5.367*** 
(1.195) 
2.493* 
(1.332) 
6.875*** 
(1.126) 
3.928*** 
(1.197) 
EBITDA×TOP1/3  4.200*** 
(0.769) 
 3.218*** 
(0.598) 
EBITDA×BOT1/3   -4.415*** 
(1.250) 
-1.782* 
(1.087) 
LogBV -0.180*** 
(0.039) 
-0.124*** 
(0.037) 
-0.121*** 
(0.037) 
-0.100*** 
(0.037) 
LogAge 0.424*** 
(0.069) 
0.346*** 
(0.065) 
0.303*** 
(0.065) 
0.287*** 
(0.065) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  0.048 
(0.108) 
0.070 
(0.107) 
0.076 
(0.108) 
0.081 
(0.106) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.029 
(0.075) 
0.005 
(0.074) 
0.022 
(0.074) 
0.005 
(0.073) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.081* 
(0.045) 
0.072* 
(0.043) 
0.074* 
(0.042) 
0.070* 
(0.042) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.040 
(0.029) 
0.023 
(0.024) 
0.027 
(0.024) 
0.018 
(0.023) 
Prob > F ( test for joint significance) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of firm years 11032 11032 11032 11032 
Prob > F (test that all firm fixed effects are 
jointly zero) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.603 0.615 0.611 0.618 
     
β2 + β3 
(Prob>F)  
-0.211* 
(0.065)  
-0.234** 
(0.037) 
β2 + β4 
(Prob>F)   
-0.054 
(0.757) 
-0.098 
(0.582) 
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amendments.  The other two are anti-takeover provisions that protect incumbent 
managers from the discipline of hostile takeovers: poison pills and golden parachutes.  
Using these six provisions, Bebchuk et al. construct the Entrenchment Index ranging 
from zero to six.  The higher the Entrenchment Index, the lower the governance quality.  
They show that the previously documented relationship between the Governance Index 
and firm value or stock returns by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) is mainly driven 
by the six governance provisions that constitute the Entrenchment Index. 
I use the Entrenchment Index “E” as an alternative proxy for governance quality 
and perform the same tests as those in Tables 2 and 3.  The results are in Tables 4 and 5 
and are consistent with the results using the Governance Index.  Similar to the fixed 
effects regressions using the Governance Index, I require a firm to have some change in 
the Entrenchment Index over time for it to be included in the fixed effects regressions.  
This requirement results in a sample size of over 7,000 firm years. 
Table 4 reports the results using FCF as the proxy for the free cash flow level.  
Column (1) in Panel A shows that as the Entrenchment Index decreases by one, firm Q 
on average increases by 6.4 percentage points.  This is greater than the 2.6-percentage-
point coefficient observed in Panel A of Table 2 for the Governance Index.  Columns (2) 
through (4) show that the coefficients on the interaction terms are not significant 
although the ones for E×TOP1/3 are quiet large.  For example, in Column (4), the 
difference in the marginal effect of the E Index between the top third FCF firms and the 
middle third FCF firms is −0.040, not statistically significant.  However, the marginal  
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Results – The Entrenchment Index “E” Interacting with Free Cash Flow (FCF).  Shown in this table are the 
panel data fixed effects (firm-level) results by regressing industry-adjusted firm Tobin’s Q on firms’ Entrenchment Index “E”, FCF 
or dummies indicating the FCF levels, interactions between E and FCF or its dummies, and the control variables.  FCF is operating 
income after taxes, interests, and dividends, scaled by total assets.   The control variables include a dummy variable for incorporation 
in Delaware, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is included in the S&P500 index, the log of assets in the current year, the 
log of firm age in the current year measured in months, and firm current year and last year sales growth.  A detailed explanation of 
the regression variables can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A.  The data are from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) and Compustat.  The sample period is 1990-2002.  To be included in these firm-level fixed effects regressions, a firm must 
have some change in E over the sample period.  Regression coefficients are shown with White (1980) robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten-percent, five-percent, and one-percent levels. 
 
Panel A: Entrenchment Index Interacting with Dummies Indicating FCF Levels 
 
TOP1/3 is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s FCF is among the top third of all sample firms in that year.  Similarly, BOT1/3 is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm’s FCF is among the bottom third of all sample firms in that year.  E×TOP1/3 and E×BOT1/3 are the 
interaction terms between E, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3.   
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are E and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
E (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.064*** 
(0.018) 
-0.056*** 
(0.009) 
-0.071*** 
(0.021) 
-0.059*** 
(0.018) 
E×TOP1/3 (β2)  -0.044 
(0.027) 
 -0.040 
(0.027) 
E×BOT1/3 (β3)   0.024 
(0.019) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
Control Variables:     
TOP1/3  0.454*** 
(0.080) 
 
 
0.425*** 
(0.076) 
BOT1/3   -0.203*** 
(0.054) 
-0.097** 
(0.046) 
LogBV -0.272*** 
(0.048) 
-0.236*** 
(0.048) 
-0.266*** 
(0.048) 
-0.234*** 
(0.048) 
LogAge 0.362*** 
(0.082) 
0.362*** 
(0.081) 
0.369*** 
(0.082) 
0.365*** 
(0.081) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  0.104 
(0.121) 
0.110 
(0.120) 
0.117 
(0.121) 
0.116 
(0.120) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.098 
(0.091) 
0.073 
(0.090) 
0.101 
(0.090) 
0.076 
(0.090) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.359*** 
(0.059) 
0.306*** 
(0.060) 
0.336*** 
(0.060) 
0.298*** 
(0.060) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.137** 
(0.057) 
0.111** 
(0.056) 
0.126** 
(0.057) 
0.108* 
(0.056) 
Prob > F ( test for joint significance) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of firm years 7868 7868 7868 7868 
Prob > F (test that all firm fixed effects are 
jointly zero) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.558 0.550 0.558 
     
β1 + β2 
(Prob>F) 
 -0.010*** 
(0.002)  
-0.099*** 
(0.003) 
β1 + β3 
(Prob>F)   
-0.047** 
(0.016) 
-0.048*** 
(0.010) 
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Table 4: Continued.  
 
Panel B: Entrenchment Index Interacting with FCF 
  
TOP1/3 and BOT1/3 are dummies indicating a firm’s FCF level in the sample and is described in Panel A.  E×FCF is the interaction 
term between E and FCF.  E×FCF×TOP1/3 and E×FCF×BOT1/3 are the three-way interaction terms between E, FCF, TOP1/3, and 
BOT1/3.  FCF×TOP1/3 and FCF×BOT1/3 are the interaction terms between FCF, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3. 
 
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are E and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
E (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.014 
(0.026) 
-0.022 
(0.021) 
-0.007 
(0.023) 
-0.016 
(0.024) 
E×FCF (β2) -0.698** 
(0.289) 
-0.404* 
(0.212) 
-0.762*** 
(0.298) 
-0.533* 
(0.285) 
E×FCF×TOP1/3 (β3)  -0.367 
(0.245) 
 -0.225 
(0.211) 
E×FCF×BOT1/3 (β4)   0.440 
(0.311) 
0.216 
(0.284) 
Control Variables:     
FCF 3.521*** 
(0.813) 
1.277** 
(0.561) 
6.258*** 
(0.882) 
3.594*** 
(0.837) 
FCF×TOP1/3  4.534*** 
(0.674) 
 2.909*** 
(0.567) 
FCF×BOT1/3   -5.695*** 
(0.862) 
-3.148*** 
(0.777) 
LogBV -0.283*** 
(0.049) 
-0.212*** 
(0.048) 
-0.215*** 
(0.047) 
-0.199*** 
(0.048) 
LogAge 0.476*** 
(0.084) 
0.407*** 
(0.079) 
0.354*** 
(0.078) 
0.362*** 
(0.078) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  0.133 
(0.124) 
0.159 
(0.120) 
0.167 
(0.120) 
0.169 
(0.120) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.165* 
(0.087) 
0.131 
(0.085) 
0.152* 
(0.085) 
0.136 
(0.085) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.212*** 
(0.066) 
0.166** 
(0.066) 
0.151** 
(0.067) 
0.148** 
(0.068) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.084 
(0.054) 
0.060 
(0.052) 
0.051 
(0.051) 
0.050 
(0.051) 
Prob > F ( test for joint significance) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of firm years 7390 7390 7390 7390 
Prob > F (test that all firm fixed effects 
are jointly zero) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.557 0.574 0.573 0.577 
     
β2 + β3 
(Prob>F)  
-0.771*** 
(0.005)  
-0.758*** 
(0.012) 
β2 + β4 
(Prob>F)   
-0.322 
(0.106) 
-0.317* 
(0.102) 
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effect of the E Index for the top third FCF firms is −0.059 − 0.040 = −0.099, highly 
significant.  The low significance of the coefficients for the interaction terms is likely 
caused by the smaller sample size and hence lower test power.   
Panel B of Table 4 shows the results of allowing the marginal benefit of the E 
Index to vary with FCF.  The coefficients for the interaction term between E and FCF 
are negative, and more so for higher FCF firms.  Consistent with the results in previous 
tables, this indicates that as FCF increases, the value of better governance becomes even 
greater.   
Table 5 shows the results using EBITDA as the free cash flow level proxy.  The 
evidence is consistent with what we have seen so far. 
3.3 Alternative estimation methods 
 
The fixed effects results show that the marginal benefit of good governance 
increases with the free cash flow level.  Next, I examine whether these results hold up in 
other regression specifications.  As mentioned earlier, the Hausman (1978) specification 
test indicates that the endogeneity caused by omitted firm heterogeneity is present and 
therefore validates the use of fixed effects models.  However, even though the fixed 
effects estimation is unbiased, it is not the most efficient.  Specifically, the fixed effects 
estimation is based only on the within firm (i.e. time-series) variation and entirely 
ignores the cross-sectional variation.  In addition, the large number of firm dummies 
included in a fixed effects model significantly reduces the degrees of freedom.   
A Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression picks up the cross-sectional variation.  A  
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Table 5: Fixed Effects Results – The Entrenchment Index “E” Interacting with EBITDA.  Shown in this table are the panel data fixed 
effects (firm-level) results by regressing industry-adjusted firm Tobin’s Q on firms’ Entrenchment Index “E”, EBITDA or dummies 
indicating the EBITDA levels, interactions between E and EBITDA or its dummies, and the control variables.  EBITDA is operating 
income before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by total assets.  The control variables include a dummy variable 
for incorporation in Delaware, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is included in the S&P500 index, the log of assets in the 
current year, the log of firm age in the current year measured in months, and firm current year and last year sales growth.  A detailed 
explanation of the regression variables can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A.  The data are from Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) and Compustat.  The sample period is 1990-2002.  To be included in these firm-level fixed effects regressions, a firm 
must have some change in E over the sample period.  Regression coefficients are shown with White (1980) robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten-percent, five-percent, and one-percent levels. 
 
Panel A: Entrenchment Index Interacting with Dummies Indicating EBITDA Levels 
 
TOP1/3 is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s EBITDA is among the top third of all sample firms in that year.  Similarly, BOT1/3 is 
a dummy equal to one if the firm’s EBITDA is among the bottom third of all sample firms in that year.  E×TOP1/3 and E×BOT1/3 
are the interaction terms between E, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3.   
 
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are E and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 
E (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.053*** 
(0.019) 
-0.062*** 
(0.018) 
-0.041*** 
(0.016) 
E×TOP1/3 (β2) -0.061** 
(0.027) 
 -0.067*** 
(0.025) 
E×BOT1/3 (β3)  0.001 
(0.023) 
-0.023 
(0.020) 
Control Variables:    
TOP1/3 0.664*** 
(0.081) 
 
 
0.631*** 
(0.075) 
BOT1/3  -0.275*** 
(0.063) 
-0.115** 
(0.054) 
LogBV -0.199*** 
(0.048) 
-0.240*** 
(0.049) 
-0.186*** 
(0.049) 
LogAge 0.310*** 
(0.079) 
0.317*** 
(0.081) 
0.287*** 
(0.079) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  0.146 
(0.120) 
0.130 
(0.120) 
0.155 
(0.120) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.064 
(0.088) 
0.095 
(0.090) 
0.066 
(0.088) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.282*** 
(0.059) 
0.326*** 
(0.059) 
0.269*** 
(0.059) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.080 
(0.055) 
0.110** 
(0.056) 
0.069 
(0.055) 
Prob > F ( test for joint significance) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of firm years 7868 7868 7868 
Prob > F (test that all firm fixed effects are 
jointly zero) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.567 0.554 0.569 
    
β1 + β2 
(Prob>F) 
-0.114*** 
(0.000)  
-0.108*** 
(0.000) 
β1 + β3 
(Prob>F)  
-0.061** 
(0.021) 
-0.064** 
(0.016) 
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Table 5:  Continued. 
 
Panel B: Entrenchment Index Interacting with EBITDA 
  
TOP1/3 and BOT1/3 are dummies indicating a firm’s EBITDA level in the sample and is described in Panel A.  E×EBITDA is the 
interaction term between E and EBITDA.  E×EBITDA×TOP1/3 and E×EBITDA×BOT1/3 are the three-way interaction terms 
between E, EBITDA, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3.  EBITDA×TOP1/3 and EBITDA×BOT1/3 are the interaction terms between EBITDA, 
TOP1/3, and BOT1/3. 
 
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are E and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
E (β1) 
(standard error) 
0.017 
(0.040) 
-0.008 
(0.040) 
0.005 
(0.037) 
-0.018 
(0.038) 
E×EBITDA (β2) -0.585** 
(0.266) 
-0.383 
(0.317) 
-0.448* 
(0.237) 
-0.163 
(0.260) 
E×EBITDA×TOP1/3 (β3)  -0.128 
(0.182) 
 -0.265** 
(0.136) 
E×EBITDA×BOT1/3 (β4)   -0.251 
(0.295) 
-0.405 
(0.250) 
Control Variables:     
EBITDA 5.336*** 
(0.692) 
3.104*** 
(0.744) 
5.602*** 
(0.670) 
3.296*** 
(0.689) 
EBITDA×TOP1/3  2.652*** 
(0.428) 
 2.523*** 
(0.360) 
EBITDA×BOT1/3   -1.963*** 
(0.657) 
-0.633 
(0.564) 
LogBV -0.206*** 
(0.048) 
-0.147*** 
(0.048) 
-0.147*** 
(0.048) 
-0.123*** 
(0.048) 
LogAge 0.449*** 
(0.084) 
0.362*** 
(0.080) 
0.316*** 
(0.082) 
0.297*** 
(0.081) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  0.220* 
(0.119) 
0.234** 
(0.117) 
0.243** 
(0.116) 
0.244** 
(0.116) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.062 
(0.087) 
0.038 
(0.086) 
0.046 
(0.086) 
0.034 
(0.086) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.165*** 
(0.064) 
0.157*** 
(0.064) 
0.158*** 
(0.065) 
0.154** 
(0.065) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.036 
(0.060) 
0.014 
(0.057) 
0.015 
(0.056) 
0.005 
(0.055) 
Prob > F ( test for joint significance) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N of firm years 7693 7693 7693 7693 
Prob > F (test that all firm fixed effects are 
jointly zero) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.582 0.593 0.589 0.595 
     
β2 + β3 
(Prob>F)  
-0.511** 
(0.035)  
-0.428* 
(0.067) 
β2 + β4 
(Prob>F)   
-0.699* 
(0.076) 
-0.670 
(0.148) 
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random effects regression picks up both the time-series and the cross-sectional variations 
while modeling the error terms differently for each firm.  Although these two estimation 
methods cannot control for unobservable firm heterogeneity and therefore will produce 
biased estimates, both of them may produce more efficient estimation.  These two 
specifications are also often used in governance studies.  It is informative to see how 
sensitive my results are to different estimation methods.   
Appendix B (Tables A1 and A2) describes the random effects and Fama-
MacBeth regressions results.  For these regressions, I relax the data requirement for the 
fixed effects regressions that a firm needs to have some time-series change in the 
Governance Index or the Entrenchment Index.  The results are easy to summarize: the 
results that we observe in Tables 2 through 5 persist. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
I present evidence that high governance quality is more valuable as the free cash 
flow level increase.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that the agency conflicts 
related to investment decisions become potentially more severe as the free cash flow 
level increases.  This result is expected because financial theories always suggest that 
firm value is created mainly through investing in positive NPV projects.  Therefore the 
most important decisions that managers make are investment decisions, and the agency 
conflicts in investment decisions can be the most damaging to firm value.  Previous 
literature documents persuasive evidence that managers are reluctant to return free cash 
flow to investors and are prone to investing in empire-building or entrenching projects 
(e.g., Jensen, 1986).  Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) find that firms with higher G 
Index (lower governance quality) have higher capital expenditure and make more 
acquisitions.  Harford, Mansi, Maxwell (2004) show that firms with higher G Index 
spend their cash more quickly, mainly on acquisitions.  When the free cash flow level is 
high, managers have greater opportunities to destroy firm value through non-value-
maximizing projects.  Governance mechanisms can increase firm value the most by 
solving the agency conflicts related to investment decisions. 
My results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that as cash flow level decreases, 
managerial expropriation increases, and governance quality becomes more important to 
firm value.  One possible explanation is that excessive managerial expropriation happens 
only when the cash flow level is extremely low, and my sorting into thirds cannot 
  
 37
capture this extreme situation.  In un-tabulated results, I also sort firms into free cash 
flow quintiles, and the results do not change.  However, we may still need extreme crisis 
for the managerial expropriation be empirically observable.  Another possible 
explanation is that my sample includes only U.S. firms.  The U.S. has stronger legal 
protection for shareholders, which makes managerial expropriation a less severe problem 
in the U.S. (e.g. Durnev and Kim, 2004).  Overall, the results suggest that the investors 
of the large sample of U.S. firms in this study have been more concerned about 
overinvestment than managerial expropriation.  This finding can be illustrated by Figure 
2. 
 
A
t
Total potential agency 
costs of equity 
Potential 
overinvestment 
Potential managerial 
expropriation 
The free cash flow level
Figure 2: An illustration of the actual non-linearity between the free cash flow level and 
the potential agency costs.  The results of this study show that for the large sample of 
U.S. firms, the potential agency costs associated with overinvestment are greater than 
those associated with managerial expropriation. 
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Certain characteristics of the Governance and the Entrenchment Indexes and the 
fixed effects specification make the results of this study more interesting and warrant 
some discussion.  The Governance and Entrenchment Indexes change slowly over time.  
Between any two publication years of the Corporate Takeover Defenses, 58% of the 
sample firms do not experience a change in their Governance Index, and 76% do not 
experience a change in their Entrenchment Index.  As discussed earlier, a fixed effects 
regression derives its estimation solely from the within-firm (time-series) variation.  
When we regress firm Q on the Governance Index using a fixed effects model, the 
coefficient on the Governance Index may be insignificant simply because there is little 
time-series variation in the Governance Index.  That is, the time-invariant nature of the 
Governance Index and the Entrenchment Index makes a fixed effects model a low-power 
test in detecting any relationship between firm value and the Governance Index or the 
Entrenchment Index.15  The very fact that we obtain significant results with fixed effects 
models makes the results more convincing: even small changes in the Governance Index 
or the Entrenchment Index are related with changes in firm value that are significant 
enough to be detected.  Along with the benefit of a fixed effects model in controlling for 
unobservable firm heterogeneity and mitigating the related endogeneity, we can be more 
confident in interpreting the results. 
                                                 
15 Zhou (2001) critiques the fixed effects approach by Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) in studying 
managerial ownership and firm value.  Zhou points out that managerial ownership changes slowly within 
firm, and a fixed effect model has low power to detect any relationship between ownership and firm value. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Theories suggest that the marginal benefit of governance quality varies with the 
potential severity of agency conflicts.  However, empirical governance studies often do 
not control for the potential severity of agency conflicts.  This oversight leads to low-
power tests and may have partly contributed to the lack of direct empirical evidence that 
better governance increases firm value, even though this is a clear prediction of 
governance theories and is supported by numerous event studies. 
I allow the marginal benefit of governance to vary with the free cash flow level, a 
proxy for the potential severity of agency conflicts.  The results show that the marginal 
benefit of governance varies significantly with the free cash flow level.  As the free cash 
flow level increases, higher governance quality becomes incrementally more value-
enhancing, and lower governance quality becomes incrementally more value-destroying.  
This is consistent with the hypothesis that higher governance quality increases firm 
value by constraining the agency conflicts in investment decisions (Jensen, 1986).  It is 
also consistent with previous evidence that firms of lower governance quality have 
higher capital expenditure and make more acquisitions (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick, 2003; Harford, Mansi, Maxwell, 2004). 
When examining the marginal benefit of a governance mechanism, researchers 
need to control for the potential severity of agency conflicts.  Future research can use the 
empirical models of this paper to explore the relationship between firm value and other 
governance variables.  Governance reformers can direct their efforts to first resolve the 
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agency conflicts in investment decisions.  Investors should be more concerned with 
governance quality when a firm is performing well and has a high free cash flow level.  
Public outcry of poor governance may be the loudest when a firm’s performance turns 
south, but good governance can potentially create more value when a firm is performing 
well and generating substantial cash flows. 
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APPENDIX A 
A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE REGRESSION VARIABLES 
 
Governance Index “G” – A firm’s G equals the number of corporate-governance 
provisions it has.  More provisions reflect more restricted shareholder rights and 
lower governance quality.  Data are from IRRC.  See Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) for a detailed explanation of this Governance Index. 
Entrenchment Index “E” – A firm’s E equals the number of the following six 
governance provisions it has: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw 
amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments, poison pills, and golden parachutes.  Data 
are from IRRC.  See Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2003) for a detailed 
explanation of this Entrenchment Index. 
Tobin’s Q – The market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (Compustat 
item 6).  The market value of assets is the sum of the book value of assets at each 
fiscal year end and the market value of common stocks at the corresponding 
calendar year end (Compustat item 24 × item 25) subtracting the book value of 
common stock (Compustat item 60) and deferred taxes (Compustat item 74).  
Each firm’s Q is adjusted by its industry median, where the 48 industry 
classification follows Fama and French (1997).  I use each firm’s historical SIC 
(Compustat item 324) when classifying industries.  When Item 324 is missing, I 
use the SIC indicated by DNUM. 
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FCF – The measurement of undistributed cash flow and is calculated as operating 
income (Compustat item 13) minus the sum of the following four components: a) 
total income taxes (Compustat item 16) minus the change in deferred taxes from 
the previous year to the current year (change in Compustat item 35), b) gross 
interest expenses on debt (Compustat item 15), c) dividend payments on 
preferred stocks (Compustat item 19), and d) dividend payments on common 
stocks (Compustat item 21).  I then scale this free cash flow measure by the 
firm’s book value of assets (Compustat item 6).  
EBITDA – Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat 
item 13) scaled by the firm’s book value of assets (Compustat item 6).  EBITDA 
measures a company’s cash flow from operations. 
Delaware Dummy – A dummy variable equals one if the firm is incorporated in 
Delaware.  Data are from IRRC. 
S&P500 Index Dummy – A dummy variable equals one if the firm is included in the 
S&P500 Index.  Data are from Compustat’s Historical S&P Major Index Code 
(item 276). 
Log Firm Age – The log value of firm age measured in months since the firm’s first 
appearance in Compustat.  
Log Assets – The log value of a firm’s book value of assets (Compustat item 6). 
TOP1/3 – A dummy takes the value of one if a firm’s cash flow over total assets ratio is 
among the top third of all sample firms in that year.  The cash flow variable is 
either FCF or EBITDA. 
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BOT1/3 – A dummy takes the value of one if a firm’s cash flow over total assets ratio is 
among the bottom third of all sample firms in that year.  The cash flow variable 
is either FCF or EBITDA. 
Sales Growth – Firm-level annual growth rate in sales, i.e. the percentage change in 
Compustat item 12. 
  
 50
APPENDIX B  
FAMA-MACBETH AND RANDOM EFFECTS REGRESSIONS 
 
I use fixed effects regressions in this study to control for unobservable firm 
heterogeneity that may simultaneously affect both the Governance Index (and the 
Entrenchment Index) and firm Tobin’s Q.  Hausman (1978) specification test indicates 
that omitted variable is present and therefore validates the use of fixed effects models.  
However, even though fixed effects estimation is unbiased, it is not the most efficient.  
Specifically, fixed effects estimation is based only on the within firm (i.e. time-series) 
variation and entirely ignores the cross-sectional variation.  All the firm dummies 
included in a fixed effects model also significantly reduce the degrees of freedom.   
A Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression picks up the cross-sectional variation. A 
random effects regression picks up both time-series and cross-sectional variations while 
modeling the error terms differently for each firm.  Although these two estimation 
methods cannot control for unobservable firm heterogeneity and therefore will produce 
biased estimates, both of them may produce more efficient estimates and are often used 
in finance research.  It will be informative to see how sensitive my results are to different 
estimation methods.  In the random effects and Fama-MacBeth regressions, I relax the 
data requirement of the fixed effects regressions that a firm needs to have some time-
series change in the G Index or the E Index.  To obtain the Fama-MacBeth results, I first 
run thirteen annual cross-sectional regressions, and then report the time-series means of 
the coefficient estimates and the time-series standard errors.  The statistical significance 
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from this procedure accounts for the cross-sectional correlation by ignoring the cross-
sectional standard errors and using only the time-series standard errors. 
 In Table A1, I show random effects and Fama-MacBeth (1973) type results of 
regressing Q on G and its interactions with FCF or FCF dummies.  In Table A2, I show 
the results with the Entrenchment Index.  The results in Tables A1 and A2 are consistent 
with those in Tables 2 through 5: the governance effect varies with the FCF level.  The 
higher the FCF level, the more adversely will lower governance quality affect firm value. 
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Table A1: Alternative Model Specifications – results with the Governance Index.  Shown in this table are the Fama-MacBeth and 
random effects results by regressing industry-adjusted firm Tobin’s Q on firms’ Governance Index “G”, FCF or dummies indicating 
the FCF levels, interactions between G and FCF or its dummies, and the control variables.  FCF is operating income after taxes, 
interests, and dividends, scaled by total assets.   The control variables include a dummy variable for incorporation in Delaware, a 
dummy variable indicating whether a firm is included in the S&P500 index, the log of assets in the current year, the log of firm age 
in the current year measured in months, and firm current year and last year sales growth.  A detailed explanation of the regression 
variables can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A.  The data are from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and 
Compustat.  The sample period is 1990-2002.  Regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses.  The Fama-
MacBeth (1973) procedure is to first run annual cross-sectional regressions and then compute the time-series averages of the 
coefficient estimates and the corresponding time-series standard errors.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten-percent, five-
percent, and one-percent levels. 
 
Panel A: Governance Index Interacting with Dummies Indicating FCF Levels 
 
TOP1/3 is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s FCF is among the top third of all sample firms in that year.  Similarly, BOT1/3 is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm’s FCF is among the bottom third of all sample firms in that year.  G×TOP1/3 and G×BOT1/3 are the 
interaction terms between G, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3.   
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are G and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables: Fama-MacBeth results 
 
 Random Effects 
G (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.032*** 
(0.006) 
-0.026*** 
(0.007) 
 
 
-0.023*** 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.008) 
G×TOP1/3 (β2)  -0.033*** 
(0.008) 
  -0.025*** 
(0.008) 
G×BOT1/3 (β3)  0.008 
(0.008) 
  0.009 
(0.008) 
Control Variables:      
TOP1/3  0.893*** 
(0.080) 
  0.610*** 
(0.078) 
BOT1/3  -0.237*** 
(0.080) 
  -0.206 
(0.077) 
LogBV -0.150*** 
(0.014) 
-0.105*** 
(0.012) 
 
 
-0.096*** 
(0.014) 
-0.074*** 
(0.014) 
LogAge -0.244*** 
(0.029) 
-0.183*** 
(0.028) 
 
 
-0.109*** 
(0.035) 
-0.083** 
(0.034) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  -0.020 
(0.024) 
-0.025 
(0.019) 
 
 
0.009 
(0.042) 
0.019 
(0.041) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.748*** 
(0.116) 
0.589*** 
(0.108) 
 
 
0.214*** 
(0.040) 
0.189*** 
(0.039) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.490*** 
(0.088) 
0.357*** 
(0.074) 
 
 
0.175*** 
(0.018) 
0.138*** 
(0.018) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.313*** 
(0.096) 
0.242*** 
(0.079) 
 
 
0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
      
β1 + β2 
(Prob>F)  
-0.059*** 
(0.000)   
-0.045*** 
(0.000) 
β1 + β3 
(Prob>F)  
-0.018*** 
(0.006)   
-0.011 
(0.187) 
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Table A1: Continued. 
 
Panel B: Governance Index Interacting with FCF 
  
TOP1/3 and BOT1/3 are dummies indicating a firm’s FCF level in the sample and is described in Panel A.  G×FCF is the interaction 
term between G and FCF.  G×FCF×TOP1/3 and G×FCF×BOT1/3 are the three-way interaction terms between G, FCF, TOP1/3, and 
BOT1/3.  FCF×TOP1/3 and FCF×BOT1/3 are the interaction terms between FCF, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are G and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables Fama-MacBeth results  Random Effects 
G (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
 -0.007 
(0.008) 
G×FCF (β2) 0.060 
(0.096) 
 -0.130 
(0.098) 
G×FCF×TOP1/3 (β3) -0.322*** 
(0.083) 
 -0.168** 
(0.084) 
G×FCF×BOT1/3 (β4) -0.065 
(0.147) 
 0.054 
(0.113) 
Control Variables:    
FCF 2.439** 
(1.004) 
 4.127*** 
(0.969) 
FCF×TOP1/3 6.961*** 
(0.885) 
 4.207*** 
(0.841) 
FCF×BOT1/3 -3.383** 
(1.409) 
 -3.924*** 
(1.093) 
LogBV -0.053*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.043*** 
(0.014) 
LogAge -0.093*** 
(0.029) 
 -0.045 
(0.034) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  -0.049*** 
(0.015) 
 0.001 
(0.040) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.461*** 
(0.095) 
 0.214*** 
(0.038) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.242*** 
(0.066) 
 0.063*** 
(0.018) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.174** 
(0.064) 
 0.008 
(0.010) 
    
β2 + β3 
(Prob>F) 
-0.262** 
(0.016)  
-0.298*** 
(0.000) 
β2 + β4 
(Prob>F) 
-0.004 
(0.976)  
-0.076 
(0.197) 
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Table A2: Alternative Model Specifications – results with the Entrenchment Index.  Shown in this table are the Fama-MacBeth and 
random effects results by regressing industry-adjusted firm Tobin’s Q on firms’ Entrenchment Index “E”, FCF or dummies indicating 
the FCF levels, interactions between E and FCF or its dummies, and the control variables.  FCF is operating income after taxes, 
interests, and dividends, scaled by total assets.   The control variables include a dummy variable for incorporation in Delaware, a 
dummy variable indicating whether a firm is included in the S&P500 index, the log of assets in the current year, the log of firm age 
in the current year measured in months, and firm current year and last year sales growth.  A detailed explanation of the regression 
variables can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A.  The data are from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and 
Compustat.  The sample period is 1990-2002.  Regression coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses.  The Fama-
MacBeth (1973) procedure is to first run annual cross-sectional regressions and then compute the time-series averages of the 
coefficient estimates and the corresponding time-series standard errors.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the ten-percent, five-
percent, and one-percent levels. 
 
Panel A: Entrenchment Index Interacting with Dummies Indicating FCF Levels 
 
TOP1/3 is a dummy equal to one if the firm’s FCF is among the top third of all sample firms in that year.  Similarly, BOT1/3 is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm’s FCF is among the bottom third of all sample firms in that year.  E×TOP1/3 and E×BOT1/3 are the 
interaction terms between E, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3.   
Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are E and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables: Fama-MacBeth results 
 
 Random Effects 
E (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.096*** 
(0.016) 
-0.068*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
-0.067*** 
(0.013) 
-0.064*** 
(0.015) 
E×TOP1/3 (β2)  -0.107*** 
(0.019) 
  -0.035** 
(0.017) 
E×BOT1/3 (β3)  0.021 
(0.014) 
  0.018 
(0.017) 
Control Variables:      
TOP1/3  0.808*** 
(0.066) 
  0.460*** 
(0.044) 
BOT1/3  -0.211*** 
(0.042) 
  -0.166*** 
(0.042) 
LogBV -0.155*** 
(0.013) 
-0.108*** 
(0.012) 
 
 
-0.096*** 
(0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
LogAge -0.249*** 
(0.029) 
-0.188*** 
(0.029) 
 
 
-0.118*** 
(0.034) 
-0.093*** 
(0.033) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  0.000 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
 
 
0.026 
(0.043) 
0.035 
(0.041) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.736*** 
(0.112) 
0.574*** 
(0.102) 
 
 
0.213*** 
(0.040) 
0.187*** 
(0.039) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.491*** 
(0.087) 
0.360*** 
(0.073) 
 
 
0.174*** 
(0.018) 
0.139*** 
(0.018) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.317*** 
(0.097) 
0.244*** 
(0.079) 
 
 
0.024** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
      
β1 + β2 
(Prob>F)  
-0.175*** 
(0.000)   
-0.099*** 
(0.000) 
β1 + β3 
(Prob>F)  
-0.047*** 
(0.003)   
-0.046*** 
(0.005) 
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Table A2: Continued. 
 
Panel B: Entrenchment Index Interacting with FCF 
  
TOP1/3 and BOT1/3 are dummies indicating a firm’s FCF level in the sample and is described in Panel A.  E×FCF is the interaction 
term between E and FCF.  E×FCF×TOP1/3 and E×FCF×BOT1/3 are the three-way interaction terms between E, FCF, TOP1/3, and 
BOT1/3.  FCF×TOP1/3 and FCF×BOT1/3 are the interaction terms between FCF, TOP1/3, and BOT1/3. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Firm Tobin’s Q Adjusted by Industry Medians 
The variables of interest in each regression are E and its interaction terms. 
Independent variables Fama-MacBeth results  Random Effects 
E (β1) 
(standard error) 
-0.025* 
(0.012) 
 -0.017 
(0.015) 
E×FCF (β2) -0.096  -0.499** 
(0.208) 
E×FCF×TOP1/3 (β3) -0.972*** 
(0.185) 
 -0.280 
(0.181) 
E×FCF×BOT1/3 (β4) 0.450 
(0.292) 
 0.360 
(0.236) 
Control Variables:    
FCF 3.096*** 
(0.469) 
 3.980*** 
(0.533) 
FCF×TOP1/3 5.953*** 
(0.593) 
 3.263*** 
(0.473) 
FCF×BOT1/3 -4.560*** 
(0.704) 
 -4.120*** 
(0.596) 
LogBV -0.056*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.043*** 
(0.014) 
LogAge -0.096*** 
(0.031) 
 -0.055* 
(0.032) 
Delaware Incorporation Dummy  -0.031* 
(0.016) 
 0.019 
(0.040) 
S&P500 Inclusion Dummy 0.455*** 
(0.091) 
 0.211*** 
(0.038) 
Sales Growth (current year) 0.248*** 
(0.066) 
 0.064*** 
(0.018) 
Sales Growth (last year) 0.167** 
(0.062) 
 0.007 
(0.010) 
    
β2 + β3 
(Prob>F) 
-1.068*** 
(0.000)  
-0.779*** 
(0.000) 
β2 + β4 
(Prob>F) 
0.354 
(0.197)  
-0.139 
(0.245) 
(0.156) 
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